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STRIKE MISCONDUCT: AN ILLUSORY BAR TO
REINSTATEMENT*
WHaEN an employer refuses to bargain with a union representing the major-
ity of his workers or otherwise commits an unfair labor practice 1 that initiates
a protest strike, the Labor Management Relations Act greatly restricts the
employer's traditional right to discharge or discipline his employees.2 At the
termination of the strike, the National Labor Relations Board will generally
order reinstatement for all workers participating in the strike, even if the em-
ployer has hired permanent replacements, to prevent the employer from frustrat-
ing legitimate collective activity by his strike-provoking unfair labor practice 3
Where employees engage in misconduct, inhibiting the peaceful settlement of
the labor dispute, the Board is faced with a conflict between two policies of the
act in choosing its remedy.4 Thus, it is uncertain whether the Board will require
*Local 833, UAW-AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 300 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nora.
Kohler Co. v. Local 833, UAW-AFL-CIO, 370 U.S. 911 (1962).
1. As defined by Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8, 61 Stat.
140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1958), amending National Labor Relations Act (Wagner
Act) § 8, 49 Stat. 452 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Taft-Hartley Act and Wagner Act,
respectively].
2. Taft-Hartley Act § 10(c), 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1958), amending
Wagner Act § 10(c), 49 Stat. 454 (1935), gives the NRLB authority both to order the
employer to cease and desist from continuing an unfair labor practice and to order hm to
remedy any injury to a worker disadvantaged by the practice. Thus, it is empowered to
order reinstatement and the payment of lost, or "back," wages where this will "effectuate the
policies of the Act." Since any discharge which occurs during a strike protesting .n
unfair labor practice would not have occurred but for the original unfair labor practice, it
is an injury arising from an unfair labor practice and will be remedied by reinstatement
and back pay. The uniformity of NLRB practice in this respect makes it accurate to say
that the employer has a much more limited right of discharge than he does in the ordinary
case. Black Diamond S.S. Corp. v. NLRB, 94 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1938); Gmtaoy, LAvoit
AND THE LAW 371-72 (2d rev. ed. with supp. 1961); Cox, The Right to Engage in Con-
certed Activities, 26 IND. L.J. 319 (1951). Cf. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp,,
301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937).
3. NLRB v. Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 748 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 883 (1954).
Under section 2(3) of Taft-Hartley, 29 U.S.C. 152(3) (1958), the employment relation
continues during the cessation of work accompanying an "economic" or "unfair labor prac-
tice" strike, so that the provisions of the act continue to apply to employer and employee
activities during this time. The right to strike is one of the forms of collective activity pro-
tected by the act, Taft-Hartley Act § 7, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958), amend-
ing Wagner Act § 7, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), and any attempt to coerce or punish workers en-
gaging in such "protected" activity is itself an unfair labor practice, Taft-Hartley Act §
8(a) (1), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1958), justifying reinstatement or
other remedy under § 10(c). Thus, where a strike is not provoked by an unfair labor prac-
tice, reinstatement may nonetheless be ordered to correct an improper dismissal, 213 F.2d
at 752, although all dismissals will not be presumptively improper as they are in the unfair
labor practice strike situation.
4. These policies are, inter alia, to "protect the right of employees to organize and
bargain collectively" and to assure that labor organizations respect employers' rights
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reinstatement of all employees to rectify the unfair labor practice, notvith-
standing the employees' tortious conduct ;5 permit the employer to discharge
some or all of the misbehaving strikers, regardless of the initial unfair labor
practice, in order to vindicate the LMIRA's policy requiring that labor organi-
zations and their members respect employer's rights as well as the public
order and safety ;G or refuse to reinstate all employees who engaged in unlawful
activities during the strike, although the employer has not formally dismissed
them.7 Such strikes, invariably marked with employer bad faith and employee
retaliation, may frequently involve dismissals ostensibly attributable to employee
misconduct but primarily intended to weaken or destroy the collective movement
in the plant. Any dismissal so intended, whether or not it occurred during a
strike, would itself seem to be an unfair labor practice under section 8(a) (3) of
the act, which proscribes discharges primarily intended to discourage or punish
union membership and thus undermine legitimate collective activity.8 But the
issue of whether such dismissals constitute new unfair labor practices has not
been adequately considered in a strike misconduct situation."
Strike Misconduct Justifying Discharge
Those tortious activities by striking employees which are sufficient to re-
store the employer's power of discharge during an unfair labor practice strike
have not been dearly defined by the Board or the courts.10 NLRB v. Fansteel
and do not jeopardize the public safety. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
(Taft-Hartley Act), § 101, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq.; National Labor
Relations Act, § 1 et seq.; 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et
seq. Cf. ,fastro Plastics Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 350 U.S. 270 ...
(1956).
Local 833, UAW-AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 300 F.2d 699, 703 n.10 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denicd sub.
nor. Kohler Co. v. Local 833, UAW-AFL-CIO, 370 U.S. 911 (1962).
5. Republic Steel Corp., 9 N.L.R.B. 219 (1938), enforced sub nora. Republic Steel Corp.
v. NLRB, 107 F.2d 472 (3d Cir. 1939), modified on other grounds, 311 U.S. 7 (1940).
6. Kohler Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1960).
7. H.N. Thayer Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1591 (1956).
8. Section 8(a) (3), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1958). Cf. NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45-46 (1937).
9. The issue has been considered in the context of a so-called "economic strike," in
which the contested issues are contract terms rather than statutorily defined "unfair" prac-
tices by the employer. In such a situation the right of the union to attempt to close the plant
by its use of the economic weapon of a strike is matched by an employer right to keep his plant
open, hire new workers on a permanent basis, and thus deprive striking workers of their
jobs. The employer, however, may not go beyond this and discharge or refuse to re-employ
at the termination of the strike workers not so replaced, nor may he fill those positions which
are open by choosing among returning strikers in a discriminatory manner. Persons so
discriminated against are entitled to reinstatement. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304
U.S. 333 (1938).
10. The employee's activity is said to be "unprotected" under § 7, so that employer inter-
ference with it is not within the prohibition of § 8(a) (1) and discharges because of it are
justified even in the unfair labor practice strike situation. Unprotected activity includes parti-
cipation in activity which would be a union unfair labor practice under § 8(b) (1) (A), 61
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Metallurgical Corp.,11 decided soon after the NLRA was passed, indicated that
any act of employee misconduct during a strike was a per se bar to reinstate-
ment. Having discharged all the strikers participating in a violent sit-down
strike at the inception of the strike, Fansteel subsequently offered to rehire a
number of them, but without recognition of their union. Because of the em-
ployer's strike-provoking refusal to bargain with the union and his coercive
activities directed against it, the NLRB found that reinstatement of all em-
ployees was warranted, notwithstanding their unlawful activities in seizing and
maintaining possession of the plant.12 Disturbed by the violence of this and other
strikes of the era, the Supreme Court refused enforcement to the Board's order,
holding that the "illegal" violence of the employees provided an "independent
and adequate basis" for the discharges.' 3 While it is uncertain whether the mis-
conduct worked to sever the employment relation, 14 remove the employees from
the protection of the act,15 or make Board reinstatement an abuse of discretion, 0
Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1958), as well as individual acts of mis-
conduct such as verbal or physical abuse of non-strikers. Cox, supra note 2; Note, Strike
Misconduct as Grounds for Denial of Reinstatement, 32 N.Y.U.L. Rzv, 839 (1957);
GREGORY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 372-82.
11. 306 U.S. 240 (1939), affirming as modified 98 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1938).
12. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 5 N.L.R.B. 930 (1938).
13. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 255 (1939). This is the
central thought of Fanstcel-that because one adequate basis of discharge exists, any other
inadequate bases (i.e., discrimination) become irrelevant, since the striker is no longer
"under the protection" of § 7. See, e.g., NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9
(1962). Strike violence is said to be particularly reprehensive because of the peaceful means
of settling disputes made available by the act. "There is not a line in the statute to warrant
the conclusion that it is any part of the policies of the Act to encourage employees to resort
to force and violence ... ." 306 U.S. at 257-58. "To justify such conduct because of the
existence of a labor dispute or of an unfair labor practice would be to put a premium oi
resort to force instead of legal remedies and to subvert the principle of law and order which
lie at the foundations of society." Id. at 253. In his dissent, Mr. Justice Reed, with Mr.
Justice Black concurring, aptly points out that reinstatement neither justifies nor encourages
violence, but merely assures that the power to bar striking employees from protection under
the act is kept out of the hands of employers guilty of strike provoking unfair labor prac.
tices. "Here both labor and management had erred grievously in their respective conduct. It
cannot be said to be unreasonable to restore both to their former status," id. at 267, leaving
peace officers to vindicate whatever public interest may have been aroused by the misconduct.
See also Hart & Prichard, The Fansteel Case: Employee Misconduct and I1e Remedial
Powers of the National Labor Relations Board, 52 HARv. L. R v. 1275, 1302-29 (1939);
NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1938).
14. The Court suggests that § 2(3) of the act was not intended to countenance acts of
"lawlessness," so that the acts themselves terminated the employees' rights. NLRB v.
Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240,256 (1939).
15. Misconduct may also be considered as taking an employee outside the protection of
§ 7 of the act, so that he remains an employee under § 2(3) only so long as the employer
tolerates him as such. This differs from the theory outlined in note 14 supra only in that the
employer is given the opportunity to make a general disavowal of intent to discharge which
may work to stop him from subsequently terminating the employment relationship. NLRB
v. Aladdin Industries, Inc., 125 F.2d 377 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 706 (1942).
16. Finally, misconduct may be considered as suspending Board power to reinstate under
(Vol, 72: 182
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the Court indicated in sweeping language that any activity which tends to detract
from the peaceful settlement of labor disputes affords an employer the right to
discharge any or all of the offending workers, regardless of his own previous
conduct.17 The rehiring of some of the employees who engaged in the same
violent activities was found to be a part of the usual employer prerogative to
pick and choose those he would hire.
However, in spite of Fansteel, subsequent cases have recognized the possibility
of abuse in automatically allowing an unfair labor practice employer to dis-
charge strikers for such minor incidents as are always predictable adjuncts to
a heated strike, and have refused to consider as serious enough to bar reinstate-
ment certain types of misconduct occurring during an unfair labor practice
strike. Thus, the Third Circuit, in Republic Steel Corporation v. NLRB,18 read
Fansteel as limited to situations involving a high degree of violence.19 Ac-
cordingly, the court ordered reinstatement of those strikers who had done no
more than might be expected from the deep involvement of union members
picketing an operating plant. Such minor disorders were found to be "pro-
tected activity" under section 7, which defines legitimate and thus protected
collective activity generally 2 0 Subsequent decisions have recognized this ex-
ception to Fansteel, treating provoked misconduct or conduct ascribable to the
"animal exuberance and mutual harassment" of the picket line-despite its
§ 10(c) of the act. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 258 (1939). It
should be clear that there is little real difference in effect among these different theories;
each contemplates a complete suspension of Board authority to reinstate, given the finding
that the misconduct took place.
17. For a strong criticism of the eloquent but over-general language which the Court's
reactions engendered, and for suggestions for a more liberal though still act-oriented,
handling of such situations, see Hart & Prichard, supra note 13. The act-centered view of
disqualification in "strike misconduct" remains the legacy of Fansteel. See NLRB v. Wash-
ington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962) ; NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361
U.S. 477,494 (1960).
18. 107 F.2d 472 (3d Cir. 1939), modified on other grounds, 311 U.S. 7 (1940).
19. [S]ome disorder is unfortunately quite usual in any extensive or long drawn out
strike. A strike is essentially a battle waged with economic weapons. Engaged in it
are human beings whose feelings are stirred to the depths. Rising passions call forth
hot words.... The transformation from economic to physical combat... is difficult to
prevent even when cool heads direct the fight. Violence of this nature, however much
it is to be regretted, must have been in the contemplation of the Congress when it
provided in Section 13 of the Act; 29 U.S.C.A. § 163, that nothing therein should
be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to
strike.... [I]t was not intended by the Act that minor disorders of this nature should
deprive a striker of the possibility of reinstatement.
Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, supra note 18, at 479. Fanslcel and Republic are not infre-
quently cited in tandem. E.g.y NLRB v. Wallick, 198 F.2d 477, 484 (3d Cir. 1952). See also
NLRB v. Elkland Leather Co., 114 F.2d 221 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940).
Cf. NLRB v. Stackpole Carbon Co., 105 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1939) ; Milk Wagon Drivers
Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287,293 (1941).
20. See notes 3 and 10 supra.
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unquestioned character as misconduct-as protected activity, not intended by
Congress to work a forfeiture of employee rights under the act.21
The Taft-Hartley amendments added to section 10(c) a proviso which ap-
pears to have been designed to delineate some conduct for which an employer
might effectively discharge his employees, by providing that the Board is with-
out power to reinstate employees who are discharged "for cause."22 The dis-
cussion of union violence and the Fansteel case in Congress indicates that
"cause" was meant to include many acts of strike misconduct,23 such as partici-
pation in those activities proscribed in section 8(b) as union unfair labor prac-
tices and in activities that violate federal and perhaps state penal statutes. Since
the proviso operates as a limitation on the Board's jurisdiction, it would seem
that the statute requires independent consideration of the meaning of cause
before permitting the Board to engage in a discretionary balancing process to de-
termine whether or not reinstatement would effectuate the policies of the act.
But the few cases dealing with the "for cause" proviso in a strike misconduct
situation 24 have not interpreted it to include any fixed category of acts which
justify discharge in all cases or to enlarge the employer's right to discharge.
21. The analysis is expressed in such terms as "protected-unprotected," "serious-
minor," or "intentional violence-spontaneous exuberance." See NLRB v. Puerto Rico
Rayon Mills, Inc., 293 F.2d 941 (1st Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Wichita TV Corp., 277 F.2d
579 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 871 (1960) ; NLRB v. Cambria Clay Products Co.,
229 F.2d 433 (6th Cir. 1955) ; Victor Products Corp. v. NLRB, 208 F.2d 834 (D.C. Cir.
1953) ; NLRB v. Wallick, 198 F.2d 477 (3rd Cir. 1952) ; NLRB v. Kelco Co., 178 F.2d 578
(4th Cir. 1944). See also NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
22. No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an em-
ployee who has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of any back pay,
if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause.
Taft-Hartley Act § 10(c), 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1958).
See Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HAMy, L. RE,.
1, 20-22 (1947) ; 1 U.S. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY O TIM.
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIoNs Act, 1947, 333-34, 537, 542-44, 558-59, 563 (1948) [herein-
after cited as LEGIS. HIST.]. The "for cause" proviso appears to apply equally to all dis-
charges, whether for strike misconduct or inefficient work. Cf. notes 63-64 infra and ac-
companying text.
23. Undesirable concerted activities are not to have any protection under the act, and
to the extent that the Board in the past has accorded protection to such activities,
the conference agreement makes such protection no longer possible. *** Persons who
engage in or support unfair labor practices will not enjoy immunity under the act.
1 LEGIs. HisT. 543-44 (statement of House conference managers). See also 1 LtGIs. HsT.
318 (report of House Committee on Education and Labor), 434 (report of Senate Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare), 882 (speech by Rep. Hartley), 905 (speech by Rep. Landis),
912 (speech by Rep. Lesinski), 917 (veto message by President Truman) ; 2 L gI. 1-1IST.
1555 (speech by Sen. Morse), 1572 (speech by Sen. Murray), 1593 (speech by Sen. Pepper).
Cf. § 1, 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958) ; 1 LEGis. Hisr. 69, 101, 176, 228.
24. In addition to Local 833, UAW-AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 300 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied sub nora. Kohler Co. v. Local 833, UAW-AFL-CIO, 370 U.S. 911 (1962), and
NLRB v. Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 748 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 833 (1954), the two
cases herein discussed, the Supreme Court has twice discussed the "for cause" proviso in
strike contexts, but only to the extent of finding that a given activity is or is not "cause"
[Vol. 72:182.
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In fact, the two most extensive attempts to evaluate the meaning of the proviso
have apparently given greater stress to the policy of protecting the rights of
employees to engage in collective activity and thus to an unrestricted discretion-
ary approach than to protection of the right of employer redress against strike
violence emphasized in Fanstee.
In the first of these cases, NLRB v. Thayer Co.,- the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit was asked to enforce a reinstatement order for numerous
employees who, during the course of an unfair labor practice strike, had
participated in "coercive" activities which the Board had nonetheless charac-
terized as protected, in accord with the Republic analysis.20 The court re-
jected this "protected-unprotected" dichotomy as unnecessary and inap-
propriate where coercive strike activities were involved, and stated that "the
actual questions in this case are whether under the circumatances the strike con-
duct was cause for discharge, and if not whether reinstatement would effectuate
the policies of the Act."27 Although the court thus recognized the two questions
posed by the addition of the proviso to the act, it characterized cause as depend-
ing upon the context of the given case rather than specific acts of misconduct per
se, and failed to enunciate any criteria relevant to a determination of "cause."28
Reluctantly accepting the remand, the Board recanted its original finding, hold-
ing that reinstatement of men who had engaged in coercive activities could not
effectuate the policies of the act. The NLRB totally ignored the first question
put to it-that of "cause"--and in dealing with the second seemed merely to
reaffirm its original "protected-unprotected" analysis, transferring these men
to the latter category on the basis of the court-imposed finding that misconduct
can never be protected activity. 9 Given the apparent requirement of the statute
that the existence of the employer's discharge power be respected by the Board
and courts, the First Circuit's attempt at a narrow definition of this power, with
its boundaries to be determined in each case by the Board, seems a compromise
weighted as much towards discretion as possible.20 However, as the disposition
within the meaning of the statute. NLRB v. Local 1229, International Bhd. of Electrical
Workers, 346 U.S. 464 (1953), and NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9
(1962).
25. Supra note 24.
26. The Board found that none of the conduct it dealt with "involved actual restraint.
violence, or coercion, or conduct which exceeded the animal exuberance and mutual harass-
ment characteristics of such strike situations." H. N. Thayer Co., 99 N.L.tLB. 1122, 1133
(1952).
27. 213 F2d at 754. (Emphasis added.)
28. 213 F2d at 753 n.6 and italicized language quoted in text at note 27 jupra. Implicit
in the dual question asked by the court, however, is the notion that Board authority ends
where "cause" begins.
29. H. N. Thayer Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1591, 1596 (1956).
30. In order for both questions to be meaningful when coercive strike activity occurs, it
would seem that there must be situations in which non-cause coercion does not automatically
divest strikers of reinstatement rights. That is, the court's opinion can be read as establish-
ing an intermediate area, in which knowledge of the employee's acts in vacuo would not be
sufficient to establish the proper disposition of the reinstatement issue. See NLRB v.
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on remand and subsequent proceedings demonstrate, the Board has been un-
willing to make use of this addition to its discretion. 1
The recent action of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 2
in reviewing the NLRB's suggested remedy 8 3 for the unfair labor practices
involved in the notorious Kohler strike, 4 has given new emphasis to the Thayer
treatment of the reinstatement issue. The Board had denied reinstatement to
the ninety workers Kohler had specifically discharged for misconduct. Some
of the ninety had not participated to any greater degree than 1,700 other strikers
in the frequent acts of violence that scarred this long and bitter strike against
a determinedly anti-union employer8 5 The NLRB found that their presence
during mass picketing or other activity where weight of numbers had contributed
to coercive effect was no less serious than active violence.30 Bare presence at
Puerto Rico Rayon Mills, Inc., 293 F.2d 941 (1st Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Efco Mfg., Inc.,
227 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1007 (1956). But see NLRB v. Wallick,
198 F2d 477 (3rd Cir. 1952).
31. Kohler Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 1062, 1193-94 (1960).
32. Local 833, UAW-AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 300 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub
nona. Kohler Co. v. Local 833, UAW-AFL-CIO, 370 U.S. 911 (1962).
33. Kohler Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1960). That portion of the NLRB decision which
was summarily enforced by the D.C. Circuit, involving reinstatement of the workers lot
explicitly discharged for their strike activities and determination that the Kohler Company
had been guilty of prolonging the strike by its unfair labor practices, is not herein discussed.
Moreover, the Board determination that the strike was at its inception an economic strike
is not of interest here except as it reflects on the reinstatement of those "permanently re-
placed" during the interim preceding its mutation into an "unfair labor practice" strike. See
note 9 supra. Since this was the period in which the plant was effectively closed by mass
picketing, few were so affected.
34. A summary of the facts appears at 128 N.L.R.B. 1145-1240. See also Select Comi-
mittee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field (McClellan Committee),
Final Report, S. RaP. No. 1139, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 2, 141-283 (1960). (Hereinafter cited
as McClellan Rep.] For more partisan views, compare PETRO, TE- KOHLER STRncE-UNoN
VIOLENCE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1961) with KExNEDY, THE ENEmn' WITaIN ch.
13 (1960). The strike, which gained nationwide attention, cost the union almost $10,000,000
over its six-year duration. McClellan Rep. at 264. The McClellan Committee majority
characterized it as "a classic example of labor-management relations at its worst-where the
community, the worker, and management all suffer and none gain." Id. at 278.
35. The strike involved company arsenals and brutal assaults on non-strikers, employer
unfair labor practices and mass picketing. Of an estimated 1800 workers who participated In
the mass picketing, the Kohler Company selected forty-four for discharge; some of those
discharged had engaged in acts beyond mere presence on the line, others were simply "there,"
and thirteen were members of the strike committee which directed the picketing activities.
The discharge of additional strikers who had either been present at or taken part in other
activities-picketing homes of non-strikers, violent picketing of the Kohler employment
office, and other miscellaneous misconduct-brought the total number of discharges to ninety.
Kohler sought to supply the NLRB with a list of over 500 incidents which it attributed to
union violence and gave wide publicity to this violence in an attempt to win consumer ap-
proval and vindicate its near-complete refusal to bargain. The union retaliated in kind, with
a broad attempt to establish a nation-wide boycott of Kohler goods. See sources cited note
34 supra.
36. 128 N.L.R.B. at 1103-08. The denial of reinstatement included among those to whom
it applied the thirty-five discharged strikers whom the Trial Examiner had recommended for
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such activities was thus held to strip employees of all protection under the
act.37 The court, however, explicitly rejected as inconsistent with the Board's
duties any such per se rule of disqualification for strike misconduct viewed out
of the context of employer provocations and unfair labor practices, and re-
manded the reinstatement issue for reconsideration in terms of the two ques-
tions asked by the Thayer court.38 In so doing in a case in which reinstate-
ment had initially been denied by the Board, the court stressed the affirmative,
discretionary nature of the decision expected of the Board that had been
neglected on the Tlzayer remand.
In discussing the first question posed by Thayer, the court did not elaborate on
"for cause" as a statutory bar to reinstatement, but merely stated that the issue
was not raised before the Board and, since it is a question peculiarly directed
to it, could not be treated upon appeal.39 The court did, however, suggest some
criteria for determining when 10(c) precludes reinstatement of employees dis-
charged "for cause," such as "the employer's unfair labor practices, each em-
ployee's job history, and the relationship between the acts of misconduct and
fitness for continued service." 4° This summary treatment of the proviso seems
reinstatement. Id. at 1192-1240. It should be noted that the question of union unfair labor
practices was never brought before the Board, although there is little doubt that many of the
activities were in violation of § 8(b) (1) (A), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1)
(A). Soon after the strike began, Kohler went to the Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board to get an injunction against the mass picketing and other union activities. The union
challenged this proceeding with a preemption theory eventually rejected by the Supreme
Court. The Court stated that the violent activities would have been unfair labor practices
under § 8(b) (1) (A) of Taft-Hartley but held that the states had not lost their police
power prerogative of dealing with violence. UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.,
351 U.S. 266, 275 (1956). Kohler probably did not complain directly to the NLRB for fear
of prejudicing the state action and resultant injunction, which could be obtained more
promptly than the corresponding NLRB order.
37. The conclusion, reached by a bare majority, seems justified, given the rules the
NLRB has adopted. Presence is the essence of the evil of mass picketing.
38. 300 F2d at 702-04. The court did not consider questions of condonation (see note
45 infra and accompanying text) or presence-as-unprotected-activity, apparently assuming
that such considerations would be better dealt with as relevant to a decision under the
Thayer doctrine than as separate "affirmative defenses." It ordered the Board to reconsider,
in the light of Kohler's twenty-year history of anti-union activities (begun with a well-re-
membered strike in 1934, in which forty-nine unionists were injured or killed by gunfire, and
styled "twenty years of labor peace" by Kohler- McClellan Rep. 145-53), its findings that
the strike had not been an unfair labor practice strike from its inception, thus opening
further possibilities of reinstatement. See note 33 mipra. A dissent to the court's opinion
questioned the relevance of Thayer to a case in which union misconduct was so blatant,
characterizing Kohler's unfair labor practices as "feeble efforts ... to protect itself against
open warfare... 300 F.2d at 711. This seems to be little more, however, than a disagree-
ment about interpretation of the facts of the dispute. Cf. note 80 infra.
39. 300 F.2d at 705. It is not dear, however, that the Board failed to consider "cause."
Some language suggests, without explicit reference to § 10(c), that it thought "sufficient
cause" was present. 128 N.L.R.B. at 1105. Cf. note 76 isfra.
40. 300 F.2d at 705. (Footnotes omitted.) Fitness for continued service seems a par-
ticularly appropriate criterion and has been referred to on other occasions. NLRB v. Puerto
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questionable. Because of relative institutional competencies, some questions of
law admittedly are within the Board's ambit of discretion.41 But the proper
interpretation of a provision which describes the outer reaches of the Board's
power would not seem to be one of these.4 Furthermore, the criteria briefly
enumerated by the court for determining whether a discharge was for cause are
among those used for balancing employer and employee interests-the second
question posed by the Thayer court. In fact, the cases cited in elaboration of the
discussion of the "for cause" factors are all determinations not of whether
misconduct constitutes "cause" but whether misconduct justifies a refusal to
reinstate under a balancing test, albeit under the somewhat different formula-
tion of this test which was espoused in the Republic decision.43
Although Thayer and Kohler formally adhered to a proviso that apparently
presupposes two separate tests for determining the validity of a discharge, the
failure to give substantive content to the first test in Thayer and the D.C.
Circuit's treatment of the proviso in Kohler indicate that, in effect, the only
operative test is the discretionary one of balancing. This balancing test explicitly
recognizes the tacit consideration underlying the apparent and misleading justi-
fication of coercion present in such decisions as Republic. Thus, these cases,
with their emphasis on arriving at a result consistent with the conflicting policies
of the act through a careful weighting of the interests of the employer and the
employee, seem to have minimized the effect of the "for cause" proviso as an
independent consideration in deciding whether to reinstate discharged employees
in any particular case.
Discriminatory Discharges Justifying Reinstatement
Insofar as Kohler commands the NLRB to use discretion comprehending
the entire context of events in deciding whether an employee has so acted while
on strike as to give his employer the right to discharge him for his misconduct,
it is a salutary decision, enhancing Board discretion in an area where per se
rules seem inappropriate. 44 But both the court and the Board appear to have
Rico Rayon Mills, Inc., 293 F.2d 941 (1st Cir. 1961) ; NLRB v. Wytheville Knitting Mills,
175 F2d 238 (3d Cir. 1949) (other employees legitimately declined to work with dis.
chargees); Note, Strike Misconduct as Grounds for Denial of Reinstatement, 32 N.Y.U.
L. Rzv. 839, 843, 847-48 (1957) and arbitration cases there cited; dissent to H. N. Thayer
Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1591, 1604 (1956) (decision on remand) ; cf. text accompanying note 28
supra.
41. O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504, 507-08 (1951); cf, SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87-88 (1943).
42. 4 DAvIS, ADMINisTRATIVE LAW TREATIsE § 30.09 (1958).
43. 300 F.2d at 705 nn.21 & 22; see notes 18-21 supra and accompanying text.
44. Thayer and Kohler are themselves good examples of this. See also Mastro Plastics
Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 280-88 (1956); speech by NLRB Chairman McCuloch,
The NLRB in Action, 49 LAB. RFn. REP. (49 L.R.R.M.) 640, 643 (1962) ; Advisory Panel
on Labor-Management Relations Law, Report on the Organization and Procedures of the
NLRB to the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, SEM Doc. No. 81, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. 5 (1960).
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overlooked 45 the possibility that Kohler's dismissal of only ninety of the 1,800
workers who engaged in various acts of misconduct, including all the impor-
tant leaders of the union4 6 itself constituted an unfair labor practice under
section 8(a) (3), which proscribes as "discriminatory" all discharges that are in-
tended to discriminate among employees so as "to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization."4 7 In fact, the Kohlcr court's reitera-
tion of the two questions posed by the Tlyer court makes it plain that it vas
only concerned with the existence of "cause," and not with reliance upon it.48
Although the Board and courts have extensively considered discriminatory
discharges where an employee is allegedly discharged for incompetence or mis-
behavior while on the job,4 9 this lack of regard for the policy of section 8(a) (3)
is typical of judicial and administrative response to employer discharges in a
strike misconduct situation-not-withstanding that in some of the strike mis-
conduct cases, the employer's rehiring of some of the strikers and refusal to
rehire others indicates a pattern from which discrimination for the purpose of
frustrating collective activity may be inferred. 0
Where an employee is discharged for strike misconduct, the question of
employer motive has been narrowly and formalistically considered, if at all.
Without explicitly relating the issue to section 8(a) (3) in terms of a new
unfair labor practice, the Board has developed technical doctrines of "condona-
45. The Trial Examiner had, in fact, given limited attention to a union contention that
Kohler's extensive files on the strike, used to justify the discharges, formed no more than a
pretext for the company's calculated attempt to destroy the union movemenL 12 N.L.IB.
at 1191-92. The Board, however, dismissed the issue in a one sentence footnote. Id. at
1102 n.63.
46. See notes 34-36 mipra and accompanying text
47. Taft-Hartley Act § 8(a) (3), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1958).
48. 300 F.2d at 702-04. See notes 27,28 & 38 supra and 80 infra.
49. An extreme example of this is Wyman-Gordon Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 561 (1945),
modified sub nor. Wyman-Gordon Co. v. NLRB, 153 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1946). Discharges
of union organizers occurred after their activities had led to a reduced production rate at a
plant whose production was absolutely vital for the war effort. The Board ordered rein-
statement on the ground that the discharges were discriminatory, inferring such discrimina-
tion from other anti-union practices of the employer and from a finding that the activities
urged as grounds for dismissal were engaged in by other discharged employees. The 7th
Circuit refused enforcement, because of the paucity of evidence and the obvious importance
of preventing interference with the war effort. This case, perhaps because of the "wvar effort"
factor, attracted the particular censure of the sponsors of the Taft-Hartley Act, who treated
it as examplar of usual board practice. 1 LEcis. HrsT. 333, 559. See also Frosty Mforn Mfeats,
Inc. v. NLRB, 296 F2d 617 (5th Cir. 1961) ; NLRB v. Vail Mfig. Co., 158 F.2d 664 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 835 (1947); NLRB v. Arcade-Sunshine Co., 118 F.2d 49
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 567 (1941).
50. In NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938), the issue was
raised in connection with an economic strike and resolved in favor of the applicability of
§ 8(a) (3). In Mackay, the failure to rehire five strikers at the end of an economic strike
because their jobs had been permanently filled by non-strikers was, in itself, unexceptional;
however, when it appeared that the five to be let go were chosen on the basis of their union
activity, a reinstatement order was properly enforced. The analogy to Mackay has never
been drawn in the unfair labor practice strike situation, however. See note 9 supra.
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tion" and "reliance" for dealing with the discharge of striking employees-
doctrines which appear to be concerned with the motive of discharge but
which are heavily weighted toward the employer's own expression of his rea-
sons for discharge. Reinstatement will be ordered where the employer has
condoned the misconduct of his workers.,' Proof of condonation requires an
expression by the employer to a particular worker or group of workers to the
effect that he has waived or forgiven the misconduct 2 If he has made no
such indication, the fact that the employer fails to discharge or rehires others
whom he knows to have taken part in the same activity is not condonation of
it, but a legitimate exercise of his power to choose those he wishes to employ.
a
The inability of the condonation doctrine to deal with discriminatory situa-
tions seems well demonstrated by the Kohler decision. In a dissent, one mem-
ber of the Board expressed a conviction that the company was using the mis-
conduct as a cloak for its intent to "oust the [u]nion. '' 4 Yet the same member
cast the decisive vote in the Board determination that "condonation" was not
present.55
Reinstatement may also be ordered if the Board determines that there was
no reliance on the misconduct. If the employer fails to state his reason for
discharge, or states one other than the strike misconduct, the Board may re-
fuse to recognize his later allegation that he actually did rely on the miscon-
duct. Thus, investigations into the genuineness of the "reliance" upon the
grounds urged for discharge have tended to stop with the finding that the
employer has never formally indicated non-reliance-a sort of personal con-
51. Note, Strike Misconduct as Grounds for Denial of Reinstatesent, 32 N.Y.U.L. Iuv.
839 (1957).
52. E.g., NLRB v. E.A. Laboratories, Inc., 188 F.2d 885 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 871 (1951); NLRB v. Aladdin Industries, Inc., 125 F.2d 377 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
316 U.S. 706 (1942). The requirements are made more stringent by the rule that:
Where misconduct is clear, condonation may not be lightly presumed from mere
silence or equivocal statements, but must clearly appear from some positive act by
an employer indicating forgiveness and an intention of treating the guilty employees as
if their misconduct had not occurred.
NLRB v. Marshall Car Wheel & Foundry Co., 218 F.2d 409, 414 (5th Cir. 1955). This
rule apparently was adopted by the Board in Kohler Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 1062, 1105 (1960).
Compare this with the Fifth Circuit's similar approach to "assembly line" discharges, note
65 infra. Cf. text accompanying notes 70-78 infra.
53. This "right" to pick and choose was first referred to in NLRB v. Fansteel Metal-
lurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 259 (1939). That case involved a fact situation in which dis-
crimination could have been found but for the fact that the chief union adherents "chose"
themselves by refusing to scab. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 5 N.L.R.B. 930, 945, 949
(1938). See also NLRB v. Clearfield Cheese Co., 213 F.2d 70, 75 (3d Cir. 1954) ; NLRB
v. Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 179 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1950) ; Brief for NLRB, p. 120, Local 833,
UAW-AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 300 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Cox, supra note 2; Note,
Strike Misconduct as Grounds for Denial of Reinstatement, 32 N.Y.U.L. P~v. 839 (1957);
notes 58-62 infra and accompanying text.
54. Kohler Co., 128 N.L.1?B. 1062, 1137 (1960).
55. Id. at 1102-08.
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donation. 56 Although these doctrines may be viewed as an inquiry into the
reason for the discharge, their limited scope and technical requirements render
them ineffective as criteria for determining whether the discharge is discrimina-
tory and thus whether the discharge is itself a new unfair labor practice for which
the remedy of reinstatement, regardless of misconduct, seems warranted.5 7
Criteria to determine employer intent have long been used in analogous cases
of discharges of assembly line employees rs and of refusals to rehire economic
strikers. Thus, after an economic strike, an employer, as a matter of right, may
refuse to rehire any employees he wishes but he may not do so with an intent
to discourage union membership or activity in his plant.5 9 The policy underlying
reinstatement of assembly line workers or economic strikers discharged for their
union support activities-protection and fostering of collective activity-would
equally seem to apply to misbehaving strikers discharged for similar reasons. But
unconsidered language in the Fansteel opinion, implying that once employees are
found to have committed an act of misconduct, their employer possesses the
right to hire or fire them on any basis, appears to have furnished the basis for
treating the strike misconduct situation differently. ° The emphasis upon this
right to "pick and choose" among striking employees, stated without the
qualification which the analogous holdings of other cases and 8(a) (3) would
seem to require, has inhibited realistic consideration of whether strike mis-
conduct discharges are themselves unfair labor practices. 1 In addition, this
judicial insensitivity to the possibility of employer discrimination may be at-
tributable to an understandable reluctance on the part of courts to inquire into
the question of motive, a difficult inquiry in itself, in the context of a heated
strike situation.62
56. NLRB v. Anchor Rome Mills, Inc., 228 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1956) ; NLRB v. Clear-
field Cheese Co., 213 F.2d 70 (3rd Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Wallick, 198 F.2d 477 (3d Cir.
1952).
57. Compare Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 200 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1952) and
NLRB v. Electric City Dyeing Co., 178 F.2d 980 (3rd Cir. 1950) ("condonation" found
on a broad basis where employers discharged from assembly line), with Wilson & Co. v.
NLRB, 120 F.2d 913, 923-34 (7th Cir. 1941) and NLRB v. Clearfield Cheese Co., 213 F.2d
70, 75 (3rd Cir. 1954) (condonation not found in strike misconduct situations because of
formal employer acts).
58. For recent examples, note the Trial Examiner's reports in Walton Mfg. Co., 124
N.L.R.B. 1331, 1340-75 (1959), and Frosty Morn Meats, Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 1586, 1594
(1960). Cf. cases cited note 57 mpra.
59. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
60. See NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 254, 259 (1939); note 13
.supra.
61. See cases cited note 53 supra. It should be noted, however, that, contrary to the
apparent meaning of the words the Court used, the employer did no"choosing" in the
Fansteel situation. He discharged all and hired those who applied to come back-men who
were, of course, the weakest of the union adherents. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 5 N.L.R.B.
930, 945, 949 (1938).
62. It should be kept in mind that it is economically somewhat easier for employers to
dismiss a few extra men from a picket line in order to conceal his improper motive than
it is for him to dismiss "decoys" from an operating assembly line along with union leaders
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Although discrimination may be present in the discharge of a delinquent
striker, as in the discharge of an inefficient worker, the fact that misconduct
is more public than inefficiency may seem to make the issue of motive less
important. When a "cause" which dearly affects the employer's interests plain-
ly exists, it might seem that motive speaks for itself. But this argument would
also seem to be relevant to those cases in which the existence of "cause"
for discharge from the assembly line is similarly clear.03 In fact, the discussion
of the "for cause" proviso in Congress indicates that many of its supporters de-
sired to inhibit the inference of improper motive where an independent reason
for discharge of non-striking employees was established. 4 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit, relying upon a restrictive interpretation of the
reinstatement authority of the NLRB and upon these legislative statements,
has established a rule in non-strike dismissal cases giving special weight to the
employer's testimony that he has relied upon "cause" when that cause is found
to have existed. It has thus frequently refused enforcement of reinstatement
orders in such situations, in spite of the presence in the record of ample testimony
upon which the Board might have relied in finding that the employer's motive
for discharge was discriminatory, regardless of the existence of "cause".06 As
this court recently stated:
of whom he wishes to be rid. The difficulty of proof and need for thoroughness in fact-
finding efforts are correspondingly greater.
63. I.e., insubordination, inefficiency, violation of important plant rules.
64. Thus, the House Report is particularly concerned with cases like Wyman-Gordon
Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 561 (1945), modified sub noin. Wyman-Gordon Co. v. NLRB, 153 F.2d
480 (7th Cir. 1946), in its discussion of § 10(c) : "The Board may not 'infer' an improper
motive when, the evidence shows cause for, discipline or discharge." 1 LEGns. Hs5. 333-34.
(Emphasis added.) The original wording of the House Bill reflects the changed emphasis
they desired in an altered burden of proof which did not survive the Conference Report. "No
order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual ... unless the weight
of the evidence shows that such individual was not suspended or discharged for cause." Id. at
69. (Emphasis added.) Reference to Wyman-Gordon in the Conference Report and textual
discussion of the "for cause" proviso, moreover, makes it appear that this effect was still
anticipated for the "assembly line' situations to which § 10(c) was the only applicable
language. Id. at 559. Senator Taft, on the other hand, in presenting the Conference Report
to the Senate, stated that he felt the emphasis had not been changed and that the question of
motive was "[i]n every case ... a question of fact for the Board to determine." 2 LEGIS, HIssT.
1593. This interpretation was also urged as the correct one by Professor Cox, who found
the real danger in the potential encouragement of discrimination by those who believed that
the House interpretation would be put upon it. Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Managcment
Relations Act, 1947, I, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1, 20 (1947). Senator Taft's remarks have been
cited by favorably disposed courts, both in "assembly line" discharge situations to which
they were directed, NLRB v. Dixie Shirt Co., 176 F2d 969, 974 (4th Cir. 1949) ; and in
"strike misconduct" situations to which they were not, Local 833, UAW-AFL-CIO v.
NLRB, 300 F.2d 699, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied sub nom. Kohler Co. v. Local 833,
UAW-AFL-CIO, 370 U.S. 911 (1962).
65. NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 286 F2d 16, 25 (5th Cir. 1961) rcv'd, 369 U.S. 404
(1962). In addition to the Fifth Circuit cases cited in these two opinions, see NLRB v.
Fontainbleau Hotel, 49 L.R.R.M. 2890 (5th Cir. 1962); Schwob Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 49
L.R.R.M. 2360 (5th Cir. 1962). Compare NLRB v. Croscill Curtain Co., 49 L.R.R.M. 2317
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In each such case such membership may have been the cause [of discharge or
lay-off], for the union was not welcomed by the persons having authority
to discharge and employ. If no other reason is apparent, union member-
ship may logically be inferred. Even though the discharger disavows it
under oath, if he can assign no other crediblc motive or cause, he need
not be believed. But it remains true that the discharger knows the real
cause of discharge, it is a fact to which he may swear. If he says it was
not union membership or activity, but something else which in fact existed
as a ground, his oath cannot be disregarded because of suspicion that he
may be lying. There must be impeachment of him, or substantial con-
tradiction, or if circumstances raise doubts, they must be inconsistent
with the positive sworn evidence on the c.act point.00
Thus, if the employer can prove that a cause was given and alleges that he
relied on it, the necessarily circumstantial evidence which the Board must
often use will frequently be found wanting, however convincing it might seem
as an interpretation of the record as a whole.67 The effect of this rule has been
to create a stricter standard of review for reinstatement orders than for cease
and desist orders; 68 not infrequently the court enforces cease and desist orders
(4th Cir. 1961), in which an order was denied because of scant "cause" (complaint of anti-
union worker placed opposite to dischargee on morning of discharge), with NLRB v.
Bendix Corp., 49 L.R.R.M. 2675 (6th Cir. 1962), in which order was enforced in spite of
"cause' (breaking equipment, record of carelessness). For a more recent treatment explicitly
in terms of § 10(c), see NLRB v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 293 F.2d 300 (5th Cir.
1961). It should be remembered that the 5th Circuit particularly, and the 4th Circuit to
a lesser extent, sit in areas where unions have been notoriously unsuccessful in organizing
because of employer opposition.
66. Quoted in NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., supra note 65, at 25. (Emphasis added.)
67. Although this discussion is not meant to imply that Board orders must always be
enforced, compare the facts of Miller Elec. Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 265 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1959)
(denying enforcement for worker admitted to be obnoxious and hard to get along with and
discharged previous to any other indication of anti-union animus) with those of Frosty Morn
Meats, Inc. v. NLRB, 296 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1961) (strongly anti-union employer expressed
intent to fire union organizer five days before his discharge "for" disobedience). See also
Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. v. NLRB, 274 F.2d 738 (7th Cir. 1960).
68. In NLRB v. Tex-O-Kan Flour Afills Co., 122 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1941), dealing with
a similar situation under the Wagner Act, the court had noted that unlike cease and desist
orders, which are prospective in application, orders for reinstatement and back pay may
have the effect of a "penalty" on the employer, requiring payment of substantial amounts of
money. It therefore stated its greater willingness to enforce cease and desist orders. The
court apparently did not consider the "penal effect" of an uncorrected discriminatory dis-
charge on the employee discharged, nor early court discussion which foreclosed treatment of
the reinstatement remedy as a quasi-penalty. Conpare Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313
U.S. 177 (1941), Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940), and NLRB v. Fan-
steel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 256-58 (1939) with NLRB v. Carlisle Lumber
Co., 99 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1938). A vigorous supporter of Taft-Hartley in the House did
suggest that disqualification for unprotected acts was intended as a penalty against the em-
ployee (Remarks of Rep. Landis, 1 LEGIs. HIsT. 905), but the reinstatement power has long
been characterized, in terms of employer unfair labor practices, as limited in its application to
a remedial restoration of the status quo. NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862,
872 (2d Cir. 1938). As the date of Tex-O-Kan (1941) indicates, this Fifth Circuit rule
did not originate with Taft-Hartley; it has been "justified" in terms both of NLRB v.
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while denying reinstatement orders stemming from the same factual situation
and, according to the Board, the same pattern of unfair labor practices.09
A Fifth Circuit decision 70 denying enforcement to an order reinstating
union organizers and supporters discharged from a non-union shop purported-
ly for failure to meet plant work standards 71 was recently reversed by the
Supreme Court 72 in a per curiarn decision which remanded the reinstatement
order for reconsideration in a manner consistent with the rule of review
established in NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp.73 The Court, finding that
the Fifth Circuit had established a different standard of review for reinstate-
ment cases, stated: "There is no place in the statutory scheme for one test
of the substantiality of evidence in reinstatement cases and another test in
other cases." 74 Although neither the Court's opinion nor the lengthier dissent
by Justices Frankfurter 7r, and Harlan suggests that the "for cause" proviso is
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) [NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 286 F.2d
15, 23 (5th Cir. 1961), rev'd, 369 U.S. 404 (1962)] and of the amendment to § 10(c)
[NLRB v. Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills, 175 F.2d 675, 676 n.3 (5th Cir. 1949); NLRB v.
Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 293 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1961) ].
69. E.g., NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 286 F.2d 15 (5th Cir. 1961), rezld, 369 U.S. 404
(1962) ; NLRB v. Florida Citrus Canners Co-op., 288 F.2d 630 (5th Cir. 1961) ; Frosty
Morn Meats, Inc. v. NLRB, 296 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1961).
70. NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 286 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1961), rev'd, 369 U.S. 404
(1962).
71. Walton Mfg. Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 1331 (1959). In Walton it was conceded that
the plant manager was virulently anti-union, and the Fifth Circuit enforced a cease and
desist order against employer practices such as surveillance of union organizers and
coercion of workers known to be sympathetic to the union. The discharges occurred im-
mediately after the dischargees' union activities. Compare Trial Examiner's discussion
of the layoffs, 124 N.L.R.B. at 1349-75. Nonetheless, enforcement of the Board's rein-
statement order was denied because there appeared in the record uncontroverted testimony
by the employer that the women discharged were unable to keep their work up to plant
standards. 286 F.2d at 22-24. Compare, however, the Trial Examiner's study, 124 N.L.RB.
at 1353-58, 1373. The court concluded that the Board's inferences with respect to the
credibility of testimony about the reason for discharge were not supported by the record
as a whole.
72. NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404 (1962). A comparison case included in
the Court's opinion, NLRB v. Florida Citrus Canners Co-op., 288 F.2d 630 (5th Cir.
1961), is less germane to the issues here.
73. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
74. NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404, 407 (1962) (emphasis added).
75. It is of more than passing interest that Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who was the
author of Universal Camera, felt that NLRB v. Tex-O-Kan Flour Mills Co., 122 F.2d
433 (5th Cir. 1941) (see note 68 supra), was not out of accord with that decision, how-
ever out of line it might have been with decisions respecting court review under the
Wagner Act. See NLRB v. Nevada Consol. Copper Corp., 316 U.S. 105 (1942). Uid-
versal Camera, it should be remembered, was decided in a context which put chief
emphasis on increased court supervision of NLRB decisions. See 340 U.S. at 490; NLRB
v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404, 419 (1962). Compare the Fifth Circuit's use of Ul-
versal Camera in NLRB v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 293 F.2d 300, 308 n,13
(5th Cir. 1961). Walton, it would seem, approaches from the other direction, and can be
viewed as a restriction rather than an enhancement of court review power.
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involved,7 6 it would appear that opposing interpretations of that clause are at
the root of the difference between the Court and the Fifth Circuit. The circuit
court treated the proviso as virtually precluding Board consideration of dis-
criminatory employer motive whenever the employer could establish technical
"cause" for the discharge in the employee's acts; it found that the statutory
scheme had commaznded two rules of review.77 The Court's opinion implies that
the Board still can and must make the primary determination of motive. Its
rejection of the "two standards" is a repudiation of the special weight sought
to be bestowed upon the existence of "cause," and hence a repudiation of the
particular view of the "for cause" proviso taken by its supporters in the House
of Representatives and by the Fifth Circuit.78 The Court's tacit interpretation
of the proviso seems as applicable to discharges for strike misconduct as to
those for plant inefficiency or misbehavior. Thus, a finding that cause exists,
in the form of either plant or strike misconduct, does not preclude an inference of
discrimination which constitutes a new and unremedied unfair labor practice un-
der section 8(a) (3) of the act. The wording of the "for cause" proviso itself70
compels this interpretation. The proviso requires not only that "cause" exist,
but also that it be for cause that the employer resorts to dismissal. In other
words, despite the difficulty of the inquiry, the very language of the proviso-
even standing alone-must be read to forbid an employer's formally assigning
as the reason for a discharge conduct constituting "cause," when his real
76. The "for cause' proviso has but rarely been cited in "assembly line" discharge
situations such as these, although informal reference to "good" or "adequate" cause is often
made. But compare NLRB v. Dixie Shirt Co., 176 F.2d 969 (4th Cir. 1949), and NLRB
v. Sandy Hill Iron & Brass Works, 165 F.2d 660, 662 (2d Cir. 1947), with NLRB v.
Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills, 175 F2d 675, 676 n.3 (5th Cir. 1949).
77. Although NLRB v. Tex-O-Kan Flour Mills Co., 122 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1961)
(see notes 68 & 75 supra), does state "that the controlling and ultimate fact question
is the true reason" for the discharge, it precludes the only pragmatic consideration of this
question possible by giving the employer's sworn testimony about other "causet--which
will usually exist, given the imperfection of most employees--a preferred status. Id. at
438-39. This is the very practice to which the Walton Court objected. NLRB v. Valton
Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404, 407 (1962).
78. See note 64 supra. It would seem that the Court's difference with the Fifth Cir-
cuit about the Board's fact-finding discretion can only be explained in these terms. There
is an additional suggestion that this would be the Court's interpretation of the clause in
its treatment in the more recent NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co, 370 U.S. 9
(1962). That case involved discharges for spontaneous protest against working condi-
tions in an organized plant; the company contended that it might properly discharge the
participators for violating a company rule by leaving the premises without permission and
for not giving the company "an opportunity to avoid the work stoppage by granting a
concession." The Court refused to endorse a strict interpretation of the "for cause"
proviso, implying that the proviso was no more than a statement of the rule, as recognized
in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), that motive is in each case
a question of fact, independent of "cause," for the Board to determine. NLRB v. Wash-
ington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 16-17 (1962).
79. Quoted in note 22 supra.
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motivation is in fact legitimate collective activity on the part of the employee.
The discharge must not only be "for cause"-it must be "for cause."80
Additional reasons compel an examination of employer motive in the strike
misconduct situation, especially where the employer refuses to rehire some but
not all of his delinquent employees. Because misconduct during unfair labor
practices strikes usually follows acts of employer hostility to the union, the
possibility that discharges of such employees will be discriminatory is greater
than it is in the case where an employee appears to have been discharged for
inefficiency. Furthermore, the context of the discharge markedly increases the
employer's ability to conceal his true motivation by simultaneously discharging
a few less important union members.
Arguably, however, upon finding that the discharge was discriminatory, the
Board could nevertheless conclude that the policies of the act would not justify
reinstatement in the absence of a formal discharge by the employer and thus
could conclude that reinstatement was unwarranted. But the outcome of the
balance between the two conflicting policies-the protection of legitimate col-
lective activity and the fostering of peaceful and orderly settlement of labor
disputes-would seem to be otherwise. The employer's discharge is, by defini-
tion, intended to destroy legitimate collective activity; a failure to reinstate
in this situation allows the new unfair labor practice to have its intended
effect, since no other remedy but reinstatement is available. Furthermore,
although reinstatement might appear to condone or ignore the misconduct
which made the employer's unfair labor practice discharge possible as well
as compel the employer to take back persons who have demonstrated a
flagrant disregard for his interests, other means are available to vindicate
the public interest in restraining violence and intimidations by striking
employees. The employer, by voluntarily allowing some of the workers
guilty of misconduct to return to their jobs while rejecting others-on a dis-
criminatory basis-has indicated that having such employees in his plant is not
very disturbing to him; the employer's economic interest, moreover, would not
seem to give him any special standing to mete out punishment on behalf of
the public for unlawful strike misconduct, particularly where he has shown
an intent to do so arbitrarily and for what is itself an unlawful purpose. Where
non-strikers are injured by union violence,81 the NLRB could suspend its
"automatic" reinstatement rule for unfair labor practice situations and order,
as it does in connection with economic strikes, only that the employer must
consider strikers on a non-discriminatory basis for those positions which he
has not permanently filled since the union unfair labor practice.82 The guilty
union might lose its representation rights for a period of time, as was sug-
80. The Thayer and Kohler courts, however, overlooked this point and directed their
inquiry to the existence of cause, with the implication that this alone was sufficient to
make the proviso operative. See notes 27-28 .supra and accompanying text.
81. Either physically or economically.
82. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
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gested in the House bill which later became the LMRA,83 or be made to suffer
other sanctions of a similar nature that would stop short of giving the employer
arbitrary power over the jobs of its individual members. No statutory language
warrants the conclusion that such power was intended to be reserved to em-
ployers in this special situation-and the explicit command of the statute seems
to take away all employer power to use his discharge right for the illegal pur-
pose of discouraging union membership or activity. It would seem that there
is little justification for ignoring the problem of 8(a) (3) discrimination in the
case of strike misconduct discharges, for the finding that a right to discharge
exists should not be confused with the question of whether such right has been
abused. The cases have apparently failed to make this distinction and thus have
given approval to what is only an illusory command of the Fansteel decision.
83. 1 Lzr&s. HIsT. 68.
